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The revealed preference for dominated insurance-based personal pension plans in Italy 
is a decade-long puzzle. I surmise that a motivation from the supply side is a sales force factor 
deriving from the geographical distribution of financial providers, including the countrywide 
network of the state controlled Post Office. I provide supporting evidence using three biennial 
waves of the Bank of Italy’s survey on household finances from 2010 to 2014. The time interval 
includes a public pension system reform sharply raising the statutory age retirement, legislated 
in December 2011 to defuse a sovereign debt crisis. I show that the salience effect on the 
awareness of the benefits of supplementing lower perspective public pensions with personal 
pension plans strengthened the explanatory power of financial strength indicators. Exploiting 
a module in the 2010 wave I estimate a surprising decrease in the probability  of subscription 
to personal pension plans in 2014 associated to the indicator for the highest financial literacy 
level. 
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Behind the success of dominated personal pension plans: sales force and 
financial literacy factors 
 
1. Introduction 
The preference for the dominated alternative between two types of personal pension 
plans (PPPs) is a decade-long puzzle in the Italian private pension system, which includes also 
occupational schemes (Fondi pensioni chiusi or FPNs); for a recent overview see Ricci and 
Caratelli (2017).   
“New” Personal Investment Plans (PIPs), a type of PPPs introduced in 2007 and sold 
only by insurance companies, are much more widely subscribed than the alternative open 
pension funds (FPAs), offered by insurance companies as well as by banks and bank controlled 
management saving companies. The increase of PIPs between 2007 and 2018 was 3.9 times 
the corresponding value for FPAs; the ratio was 4.3 times between 2010 and 2014, the period 
of our econometric investigation1.  
                           TABLE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
The share of individual subscriptions accounted for about 85% of FPAs at end-2017; 
the share was equal to 72% among dependent workers (COVIP 2018). Subscriptions (only 
individually allowed) for PIPs were over three fifths for dependent workers, about one fifth 
each for self-employed and for others.  
PIPs’ averaged annual net returns were however consistently lower (Table 2). 
Moreover, PIPs’ Synthetic Cost Indicator (SCI), estimated by the Supervisory Pension 






                     
   TABLES 2-3 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
In an international comparison of costs for PPPs carried out by the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), PIPs’ costs (as a per cent of assets), already 
the highest in 2014, rose further in 2017; the differential between PIPs and FPAs increased as 
well (Han and Stańko 2018, Table 2).  PPPs’ costs increased between 2014 and 2017 only in 
three other countries – Hungary, Poland and Romania3.  
The preference for dominated PIPs is an example of investment mistakes of households 
paying in excess for some services.  The topic of investment mistakes is central to the field of 
household finance (Campbell 2006). Interestingly, however, they are detected mostly among 
poorer and less educated households. The case investigated in this study refers instead to 
wealthier households, who voluntarily supplement their public pension entitlements. My 
suggested explanation for such investment mistake is that it is at least partly a structural supply 
factor, namely the PPPs’ geographical market structure skewed towards PIPs. This paper 
contributes therefore to the smaller but increasing literature on investment mistakes tied to 
supply side factors (Foà et al. 2015 for Italy; Gurun et al. 2016 for the US; Argyle et al. 2017 
for the US; Hastings et al. 2017 for Mexico; Iscenko 2018 for the UK).  
PIPs are an insurance-based product, with individual subscriptions, marketed only by 
insurance companies, though possibly controlled by banking groups, and by their financial 
agents. In a highly concentrated market (95% of subscriptions’ share for the top 10 providers 
as of 2017) Poste Vita, a subsidiary of the state-controlled Post Office, with 943,000 PIPs (more 
than 2.6 times the 2010 figure) and a market share of about 30%, ranks second after the 38% 
share of Generali group (Itinerari Previdenziali 2017). The proprietary products are marketed 






(14,000 in 2010) post offices in 2017 ranges from 93% to 100% in different regions. A state-
controlled Post Office has a cross-selling strength compared to private providers when 
competing with similar financial products, as in the case of PIPs. Bank deposits are guaranteed 
up to 100,000 euro per depositor by a private national deposit insurance fund; postal deposits 
are instead fully guaranteed by the State, as advertised in all ATMs outside the post offices.  
The (moral hazard based) subliminal message on being Post Office state-controlled is likely to 
be extended to other financial products.  
The market structure for FPAs, with both individual and collective subscriptions for 
private employees and access that can be linked to employment and professional activities, is 
instead open to the competition among various financial providers: private insurance 
companies (with a market share larger than a half), bank controlled management saving 
companies (about two fifths of the market) and banks (only Intesa San Paolo, in fact, as of 
2017). Among the top 10 players (with a subscriptions’ share of about 80%),  Intesa San Paolo 
is first (37.2%) and the bank-controlled asset management group ARCA is second (27.4%),  
whereas Generali is fourth (5,6%). Five financial groups appear in the top 10 in both rankings 
(Generali, Axa, Intesa San Paolo, Allianz, Unipol).  
 As a way of comparison with the stable municipality coverage rate of post offices, 
bank-served municipalities shrank between 2010 and 2014 from 5,905 in 2010 to 5,750 in 2014 
(compared to a grand total of 7,900 municipalities, with a coverage rate of 75%); bank branches 
decreased by almost 9%. Understandably, municipalities without a bank are the smaller ones. 
To provide a simple indicator, the ratio between the shares of bank branches and of inhabitants 







Insurance agents reduction to 25,550 as of 2014 (3,300 less than in 2009) was only 
partially offset by an increase from 3,000 to 4,000 for brokers. , with a geographical distribution 
skewed toward the two regions with the largest cities, Milan and Rome.  
The geographical market structure for PIPs and FPAs matters especially when 
investment choices cannot be delegated to employers or bodies able to vet financial providers 
and to negotiate better contractual terms.  
The cost differential between PIPs and FPAs incorporates in fact a fee differential that 
is likely to induce financial promoters to nudge investors towards higher fee-generating PIPs. 
A study on life insurance agents in India, who are largely commission motivated, finds that 
agents recommend products with higher commissions even if the product is suboptimal for the 
customer (Anagol et al. 2012).  
This study aims to provide empirical content to COVIP’s hints on the role of aggressive 
selling policies as possible explanations for the preference for PIPs over FPAs (COVIP 2011 
55; 2015, 23; 2016, 43). Unfortunately, there is only anecdotal evidence on potential conflicts 
of interest, except for the implications of aggregate SCI statistics. The main focus in the 
econometric investigation is therefore on the geographical market structure for PPPs, under the 
assumption that it allows implementing selling practices skewed toward PIPs. Given the data 
constraints in the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), I proxy 
the geographical market structure for PPPs with the size of the cities where households reside. 
However, in interpreting the findings relative to the force sales factor, I take into account also 
the fee-related incentives pertaining to private financial providers.   
Financially literate individuals should be able to gather information on realized net 
returns and perspective costs of the two alternative PPPs and look through the advisers’ and 






more so if the investors’ attention is heightened by a salient event, such as an unexpected public 
pension reform, hurriedly legislated in December 2011 to defuse a confidence crisis in 
sovereign debt.  
In the empirical investigation I rely on the three biennial SHIW waves between 2010 
and 2014. The waves from the balanced panel are used to explore the role of financial literacy 
(FL) levels computed from the answers to a module available only in the 2010 SHIW.       
To anticipate the results, the main findings are three.  
First, there is evidence of a strong and persistent explanatory power of the sales force 
factor, whereby the probability of preferring PIPs to FPAs, conditional on the participation to 
the personal pension plans market, is negatively correlated to the size of the city where 
respondent household heads reside.  
Second, the salience effect on the awareness of the benefits of supplementing lower 
perspective public pensions strengthened between 2012 and 2014 the role of financial strength 
indicators, self-reported saving capability and ownership of risky asset, as explanatory 
variables of the probability of subscribing personal pension plans.  
Third, a higher FL level is surprisingly associated to a reduced probability to subscribe 
personal pension plans in the 2014 SHIW reduced wave of the balanced panel 2014.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature 
and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the SHIW data. Section 4 presents the 
econometric framework. Section 5 reports and interprets the empirical findings.  Section 6 
concludes and discusses policy implications, limitations of the study and directions for future 
research. 
2.  Literature review and testable hypotheses 






Investment mistakes, because of the discrepancy between observed and ideal behaviour, 
are central to the field (Campbell 2006) and an increasingly investigated topic in empirical 
household finance (Mullainathan et al 2012; Guiso and Sodini 2013; Hastings et al. 2013; 
Iscenko 2018 and the references therein for a supervisory perspective).  
With reference to the focus in this paper, recent studies examine how features of the 
market structure can affect invidual choices.  Gurun et al. (2016) show for the US how the 
market structure can affect individual choices for the case of expensive mortgages linked to the 
intensity of local advertising.  Argyle et al. (2017) find for the US that borrowers are more 
likely to engage in searching for a better provider the higher the number of financial institutions 
within a 20-mile radius. Hastings et al. (2017), for the case of social security privatization in 
Mexico, document that many participants invest their account balances in financial products 
with high fees not offset by higher returns. The motivation offered is that their providers invest 
heavily in sales force and advertising, non-price attributes that substitute for competition on 
price.  
FL literature has increasingly  probed into how, from the supply side, providers’ 
incentives can hinder, leaving aside behavioural biases, investors’ exploitation of FL 
competencies, geared prevalently to the demand side. Various principal-agent or conflict of 
interest arguments motivate mixed findings of complementarity or substitutability between FL 
and financial advice when considering the outcomes of investors’ choices (complement in 
Hackethal et al. 2012, Bucher-Koenen and Koenen 2015, Calcagno and Monticone 2015; 
substitute in Disney et al. 2015). These results lend support, from a policy point of view, to the 
idea that the option of a higher FL may be not an efficient use of public resources compared to 
the alternative of better structural and conduct regulation (Hastings et al. 2013). 
This paper relates also to literature on the relevance of different definitions of FL on 






annuity rather than a lump sum (Cappelletti et al. 2011, using 2008 SHIW); private pension 
system participation (Fornero and Monticone 2011a, b, using 2006 and 2008 SHIW). A related 
paper is Luciano et al. (2016), which focuses mainly on life insurance subscriptions but 
includes also pension funds subscriptions in one robustness exercise, using selectively SHIW 
waves from 2004 to 2012.  
This paper contributes to these literatures by focusing on the role of a structural sales 
force factor as at least a  partial explanation for the investment mistake of preferring the 
dominated PPP.  I take the view that such a factor combines various market structure features. 
First, an almost universal coverage of municipalities by the state controlled Post Office that 
provides its own insurance company’s PIPs. Second, a comparatively reduced, and shrinking, 
coverage rate of municipalities by bank branches that compete, on their own and through the 
bank controlled management saving companies, with private insurance companies in offering 
FPAs. Third, in the background, fee-related compensations for advisers in banking groups 
controlling insurance companies bound to push investors toward higher-fee generating PIPs.  
The econometric framework for the empirical investigation is organized around four 
testable hypotheses.  
The first, and key for the purposes of this study, hypothesis tested with a cross-section 
multivariate analysis for full samples of the three SHIW waves is: 
H1: conditional on being subscribed to any PPP, and controlling for households’ 
financial strength, namely positive saving self-reported capability and risky asset ownership, 
the probability of dominated PIPs being preferred to FPAs decreases the higher the municipal 
coverage rate of PPPs providers.  
Positive savings should first of all enhance the feasibility of investments of wealthier 
customers to supplement public pensions with personal voluntary subscriptions to PPPs. 






cases the expected sign as explanatory variable is positive. Being acquainted with risky assets, 
namely bonds, shares and mutual funds, should help ease households’ participation to the PPP 
market. The expected sign as explanatory variable for the share of PIPs to PPPs is uncertain, 
because investors familiar with market risk should be better at assessing costs and returns of 
different plans.  
A new Government’s reform, hurriedly legislated in December 2011 to defuse a 
sovereign debt crisis and implemented in 2012, sharply raised the statutory retirement age and 
ended the slow phasing in toward a generalized notional contribution system. Wealthier 
households are likely to react to offset risks on the adequacy of public pension increasing their 
subscriptions to PPPs, because able to save in the first place and/or to exploit the tax breaks 
they were entitled to4.  
Hence, the second testable hypothesis, that follows from H1, on the expected variation 
of key estimates, especially between 2012 and post-reform 2014:  
H2: when comparing the 2012 SHIW wave to the 2014 one, the stability of estimates 
for the sales force factor across waves should be associated to an increased explanatory power 
for households’ financial strength indicators.  
In contrast with the various theoretical predictions of complementarity/substitution 
relations between FL and financial advice, a higher FL should unambiguously thwart the 
preference for PIPs induced by the exogenous geographical distribution of PPPs providers.   
Accordingly, a third testable hypothesis in the cross-section multivariate analysis for 
the reduced samples of the three SHIW waves drawn from the balanced panel, assuming that 
respondent household heads have the identical FL level computed in 2010, is:   
H3: conditional on being subscribed to any PPP, with a probability increasing with the 






FL. The coefficient estimate for the FL indicator should be more statistically significant in the 
post-reform 2014 SHIW wave, owing to the reaction of wealthier households.   
The indicator of the highest level of FL computed when all three questions are answered 
correctly in the 2010 SHIW wave is likely not to fit adequately the decision process for pension 
investments. Lower FL levels could in fact be enough (Lusardi and Mitchell 2014 and 
references therein; Hastings et al. 2013, 2017).  Hence the fourth testable hypothesis, sort of 
robustness check on H3: 
H4: lower FL indicators could yield estimation results similar to the one for the highest 
FL level.  
   
3.  The 2010-2014 SHIWs  
The Section is organized as follows: a) an overview of SHIW and an assessment of the 
representativeness of household heads’ self-reported subscription rates; b) an exploratory 
analysis of the association between FL levels computed for the 2010 SHIW wave and 
subscription rates to the private pension system. 
 
a) Overview of SHIWs. The Bank of Italy’s SHIW is a biennial survey on income and 
wealth with about 8,000 households as sampling units; the household head (HH) is the 
respondent who takes the main decisions on household finances. As in previous studies using 
SHIW on private pension participation, in the econometric investigation the estimation sample 
is restricted to 25-65 years old HHs, excluding those unemployed or out of the labour force.  
Each survey, besides a fixed template, has modules that may or may not be replicated 






participation to the private pension system.  A module on FL is present only in the 2010 SHIW, 
and this is the reason for using a balanced panel of 2320 HHs when testing H3 and H4.   
The 2010-2014 interval, against the backdrop of a prolonged recession and of almost 
no inflation, allows to investigate the possible effects of one major, unexpected but widely 
discussed and resented reform. The only change for the private pension system was in fact a 
minor rise in the substitute tax rate on financial returns5. 
 Wealthier HHs, who are likely to be more interested in – and financially capable of – 
subscribing PPPs, are also the ones more affected by under- and mis-reporting on (net of taxes) 
income and current value of wealth, real and financial (including pension funds and life 
insurance), as exhaustively documented by Baffigi et al. (2016, Section 4). I deal with these 
data issues as follows. First, I adjust household income6 for the number of its components, 
using the OECD equivalence weights; second, I split the resulting equivalised income and 
financial assets by deciles; third, I use a binary variable owner/no owner of the main home as 
an indicator of housing wealth7; fourth, I take into account the main household debt with a 
binary variable on whether a HH is/is not a mortgagee. The drawback of these choices, with all 
binary explanatory variables, except for age, is to shrink the variation in micro data, already 
low over a time span of five years, and to have high correlation among the indicators of 
equivalised income and financial assets. With respect to this last issue, to reduce collinearity, I 
drop financial assets as an explanatory variable.  
In order to take into account the fact that financial constraints could inhibit proper 
investment choices, I exploit the question, present in all three waves, of whether the HH has 
been able to save in the reference year8. As expected, positive savings are associated with 
higher subscription rates in the private pension system (Table a.2 in the Online Appendix).  
Caution is warranted in drawing policy implications from the results of an empirical 






The sum of the averaged subscription rates to any private pension plan in each SHIW 
wave (24.8, 26.5 and 23.6 per cent) is roughly similar to the self-reported grand total only 
assuming that the HHs acknowledging employers’ matching contributions subscribe only to 
FPNs. SHIW data on employers’ matching contributions include however also the voluntary 
ones for FPAs and PIPs. The ratio of PIPs to FPAs is also much higher than in COVIP data 
(Tables 1 and A.1).  
It is worth noticing some differences in the cross section data when using full, rather 
than reduced samples drawn from the balanced panel, under the assumption that the surviving 
25-65 years old HHs in the successive waves do not change their self-reported FL in the 2010 
wave. By construction, the samples in the successive waves are modified because HHs aged 
65+ exit but there are no entries. The changed composition yields an increasing average age 
and consequently, as suggested by a life-cycle framework, higher average equivalised incomes; 
the subscription rates to any private pension plans remain almost unchanged, in contrast with 
the downward trend in the full samples (Tables A.1-2).  
 
b) Financial literacy and personal pension plans subscriptions.  
FL requirements vary in relation to different instruments for retirement saving. As 
underlined in OECD (2016, 128), decision-making about retirement is likely to be more 
difficult and call for better FL when making choices on PPPs. Indeed, a more diversified 
portfolio of investment alternatives needs greater financial skills when compared to the 
occupational plans, which have a narrower range of options as for the choices of the provider 
and of the plan.  
The questions operationalizing the enquiries on the FL that have come to be known as 






(e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell 2011a, Klapper et al. 2016) are unlikely to fit the required 
competencies for retirement investment choices. In addition, how to map into a meaningful 
ranking score the number of correct answers to fairly different questions is an open issue (Hung 
et al. 2009). Finally, a necessary condition for financially literate potential subscribers to 
implement “optimal” choices is that they earn enough to save.  
Against this backdrop I exploit the 2010 SHIW, which has a module with three 
questions closely resembling the Big Three (see Appendix  for the wording). The first question 
combines concepts of fixed and variable interest rate mortgages and of variable or constant 
mortgage instalments; a second question is centered on nominal interest rate and inflation; a 
third one is on risk diversification. As is common in international comparisons on FL (Lusardi 
and Mitchell 2014), around one third of HHs answer correctly to all three questions; the risk 
diversification issue is the least understood one.  
As expected, the distribution of correct answers among subscribers of private pension 
plans is tilted towards a higher score, though no strong association is detected with different 
levels of FL (Table 4).  
TABLE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
4. The econometric framework  
The multivariate analysis relies on single wave cross-sections estimates in order to cope 
with the reduced variation of the binary variables in the short time span.   
To test H1 and H2 I use a reduced form specification to explain the revealed preference 
for PIPs, conditional on participating to the PPP market. I deal with this sample selection 
problem using a standard two step Heckman probit procedure, whereby the second step 







The choice of the dependent variable in the first step is motivated by the quality of the 
data retrieved from the SHIW, besides the issues mentioned in Section 3 a). PPP subscriptions 
are self-reported by respondents when answering a precise question on being subscribed to 
PIPs or FPAs. The answer to an overall question on the participation to the private pension 
system (see Appendix for the wording) encompasses the cases of  being a subscriber to FPNs, 
FPAs or PIPs as well as to “pre-existing occupational plans”, namely occupational plans 
existing before the general pension system reform of early ‘90s that created FPNs, FPAs and 
“old” PIPs  (PIPs analysed in the study are new PIPs, started in 2007). 
 The probit specification in the first step (subscripts for the respondents omitted for 
simplicity) aims at explaining the probability of HHs’ participating to the PPP market, and to 
this aim includes three categories of variables: the usual controls for household income, 
demographic characteristics and home ownership, two indicators of financial strength, a 
categorical variable to proxy the local availability of PPP providers. More specifically:   
Pr (PPP = 1| D, FS,  GS ) = F(αD + βFS + γGS) + ε                               (1) 
where: 
PPP = binary variable equal to 1 if a HH subscribed to any PPP, 0 otherwise;  
D = vector of binary controls, except for the continuous variables age and age squared, 
describing the socio-demographic profile: second to tenth equivalised income decile, female, 
upper secondary degree, university degree, single, widowed, private employee, public 
employee, employed in a small firm (5-49 workers), medium firm (50-99), big firm (100 and 
over), household location in the North, household location in the Centre, home owner and 
mortgagee;  
FS = vector of binary variables for financial strength: positive saving, risky asset owner, 






GS = vector of binary variables proxying the sales force factor with the size of the city 
households reside in: medium city (20,000 to 40,000 inhabitants); large city (40,000 to 
500,000); big city (500,000 and over); 
ε = error term;  
F = cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. 
The reference characteristics of the omitted HH are male, up to lower secondary degree, 
married, self-employed, employed in a micro firm (1-4 workers), household location in the 
South, first decile of equivalised income, no home owner, no mortgagee, no saving, no risky 
asset owner, small city (less than 20,000 inhabitants). 
To investigate on the success of PIPs in the PPP market the exclusion restrictions are 
motivated by interest in assessing the explanatory power of the financial strength indicators 
and of the proxies for the sales force factor behind the revealed choice of the dominated PIPs, 
controlling for the collective subscription option open only for FPAs.  The second step probit 
specification is therefore:  
Pr (PIP/PPP = 1| D’, FS,  GS ) = F(α’D’ + β’FS + γ’GS) + η                      (2) 
where: 
PIP/PPP = binary variable equal to 1 if the subscribed PPP is a PIP and 0 if it is a FPA9;   
D’ = vector of binary controls for the employment status (private employee, public 
employee), to control for the option of collective FPA subscriptions for private employees; 
FS, GS = as in the first step specification;  
η = error term.  
The expected sign for positive saving is positive, if financial providers aim successfully 
at selling PIPs to wealthier customers. It is uncertain for the ownership of risky assets: investors 






therefore being less prone to subscribe PIPs; from a supply side perspective, it could be a signal 
to attract financial providers toward wealthier HHs. Under the maintained hypothesis on the 
sales force factor, the higher municipality coverage rate of financial providers (most especially 
the Post Office) pushing for PIPs should yield negatively signed estimates for larger city size 
indicators.   
In order to test H3 and H4 I augment (1) and (2) for a two step Heckman procedure 
with a binary indicator, equal to 1 when all three FL answers are correct: 
Pr (PPP = 1| D, FS,  GS, FL2010 ) = F(αD + βFS + γGS+ δFL2010) + ε (3) 
 
Pr (PIP/PPP = 1| D’, FS,  GS, FL2010 ) = F(α’D’ + β’FS + γ’GS+ δ’FL2010) + η (4). 
 
where the dated FL indicator reminds that it is assumed invariant also for the 2012 and 2014 
cross sections drawn out of the 2010-2014 balanced panel.    
The expected sign for FL, as discussed in Section 2, is positive in the first step estimates 
and negative in the second step ones. 
Finally, to assess whether different definitions of FL levels matter I run (3) and (4) 
substituting the indicator of top FL with each of the seven alternatives (indicator = 1 for correct 
answers to, respectively, one, two, or at least two questions; 0 otherwise; for descriptive 
statistics see Table A.2), under the assumption that a HH subscribed to a PPP should be able to 
answer correctly at least to one FL question. 
 
5. Empirical findings and discussion 
 
5.1 Full sample cross sections.  
The overall chi-square test significantly rejects the null of equations independence in 






The estimates in both steps broadly provide support to H1 and H2, with some interesting 
differences when comparing the three SHIW waves. 
 
                                   TABLES 5 AND 6 APPROXIMATELY HERE 
 
i. The estimated coefficients for the larger municipalities indicators are highly significant 
and negatively signed in all waves the second step estimates.  This result, providing empirical 
support to the hypothesis on the role of the sales of force factor, is remarkable given that the 
coefficients for the same variable are always negatively signed and highly significant also in 
the first step estimates.  
ii. To better interpret these findings, I compute the average marginal effects for HHs aged 
45 years (a typical worker’s prime age peak), to be interpreted as the change in probability of 
preferring PIPs when binary variables take a value of one, instead of zero (Table 6). Compared 
to the reference case of small city, the probability is always lower:  13.7 per cent for medium 
cities and 12.9 for large ones in 2010; 12.6 for medium cities in 2012; 11.4 for large cities and 
a peak of 20.2 for the big cities in 2014.  The broadly similar average marginal effects when 
using the reduced samples out of the 2010-2014 balanced panel (Table 6, in italics), in spite of 
the different composition compared to the full samples, provide a robustness check supporting 
the empirical evidence for H1. 
iii. The first step estimates for the probability of being subscribed to any PPP provide 
highly significant and positively signed coefficients for both FS indicators. As expected, the 
second step estimates are poorly significant.    
iv. The expected increasing role of financial strength indicators between 2012 and 2014 as 
explanatory variables for the personal pension investments of wealthier households after the 






market. The coefficient estimates of FS indicators show in fact increasing values and statistical 
significance between 2012 and 2014. In addition, housing wealth, proxied by home ownership, 
is (strongly) significant only in 2014. I surmise that these results provide adequate supporting 
evidence for H2. 
                       
5.2 Financial literacy in cross sections out of the balanced panel.  
The addition of the FL indicator for three correct answers in both estimation steps,  
yields only a weak support to H3. FL2010, though negatively signed as expected in 2010 and 
2014, is not significant as an explanatory variable in the second step; the variable enters 
negatively also in the first step, and is statistically significant only in 2014.  
The average marginal effect computed out of the first step probit estimates yields a 
change in the probability of subscribing to any PPP when FL2010 takes a value of one, instead 
of zero, of -3,8 per cent, at a 5 per cent significance level.  
When investigating for H4, substituting the three correct answers binary indicator with 
each of the seven alternatives, only the indicator of correct answers to the two questions on risk 
diversification and mortgages results significant, with an almost identical average marginal 
effect (-3.6 per cent). This result fits the literature according to which, though risk 
diversification is the least understood concept in FL (Hastings 2013; Klapper et al. 2016), it is 
the one that matters most in retirement planning and precautionary savings (Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2011b; on US data, Lusardi 2015).  







Though the negative, albeit small, average marginal effect of FL for the subscription 
rate to PPPs is puzzling, it is worth noticing that a very recent paper finds no association 
between FL and the probability of private retirement saving account or private pension schemes 
subscription for Ireland (Nolan and Doorley 2019).   
The evidence I provide is not easily comparable, given the focus on the PPP market, to 
the findings of previous studies that investigate the participation rate in the Italian private 
pension system as a whole, using SHIW editions with different wordings in the FL module. 
The correct answer to the question on the effect of inflation on the purchasing power is 
significant at the 10% level in the 2008 SHIW (Cappelletti and Guazzarotti 2010). In the LPM 
estimates, the correct answer to the question on interest rate, which is also, surprisingly, the 
least understood, is significant, at the 1% level in the 2006 SHIW, whereas the correct answer 
to the question on inflation is not significant; in the probit estimates, being able to answer all 
three questions correctly is not statistically significant (Fornero and Monticone 2011a). 
Average marginal effects of FL on private pension subscriptions are highly significant, large 
and increasing with FL levels, especially with IV probit estimates in the 2010 SHIW 
(probability up to 42% to participate in the private pension with three correct FL answers), 
though there are no controls for positive saving (Ricci and Caratelli 2017). It is interesting to 
note that in this last study the size of the municipality has an explanatory role on the demand 
side, because it is one of the two variables chosen to instrument the endogenous FL, assuming 
that larger municipalities provide easier access to banking services, besides ICT and education. 
This rationale could be intuitively adopted also for arguing that there should be a positive 
correlation between PPP subscription rates and municipalities size. The first step estimates on 
Table 5, however, consistently negative and highly significant, suggest it is worth exploring a 






Due to the likely endogeneity of FL to the financial choices I cannot impute a causal 
interpretation to the estimated coefficients (Jappelli and Padula 2015).  
 
6. Conclusions  
This paper has investigated the reasons behind the preference of Italian workers for the 
dominated alternative of personal pension plans, i.e. insurance-based  PIPs instead of open 
funds FPAs. This decade-long investment mistake à la Campbell (2006) offers a clue to the 
role of structural supply factors that need to be taken into account in order to assess the 
available set of choices for pension investment. An emerging literature has detected supply 
side factors countervailing the expected demand side determinants, be they marketing expenses 
or advisors’ incentives or financial competence (Foà et al. 2015 for Italy; Gurun et al. 2016 for 
the US;  Argyle et al. 2017 for the US; Hastings et al. 2017 for Mexico; Iscenko 2018 for the 
UK).  I contribute to this literature by adding the factor of the geographical distribution of 
providers tilted towards the dominated instrument. One key component is the countrywide 
network of the state-controlled Post Office selling only PIPs of the subsidiary insurance 
company. A second component is the larger scope left to private insurance companies, 
providers of both PIPs and FPAs, in comparison to banks and bank-controlled management 
saving companies, providers of FPAs only.  
The evidence of a structural supply factor tilted towards PIPs is robust across SHIW 
waves. This result is the more remarkable because the widely debated and politically 
controversial shock of a public pension reform in the midst of a sovereign debt crisis should 
have raised the salience of a proper choice in personal pension plans, especially among 
wealthier households. Indeed, financial strength indicators are statistically significant and 






subscription rate to personal pension plans in the 2014 wave; they were negligible in the 2012 
wave.  
This paper contributes also to the financial literacy literature. More financially literate 
investors should be better at understanding the advantages of supplementing public pension 
entitlements with voluntary personal pension plans and to look through the sales force factor 
inducements to push for preferring one of the alternative PPPs. I estimate instead a surprisingly 
negative, though small, coefficient for the FL indicator, amounting to a decrease in the 
probability of subscribing PPPs in the 2014 wave. Caution is warranted in considering this 
result, because of the reduced sample of the cross- sections drawn from a 2010-2014 balanced 
panel with a FL level, computed only for the 2010 SHIW wave and therefore assumed invariant 
for the following waves.   
I surmise that these findings have two main policy implications.  
First, public policies aimed at improving consumer financial outcomes, whatever the 
level of financial literacy, have to encompass a wide variety of regulatory approaches, to avoid 
frictions in local markets because of an excessive pressure by suppliers. Structural regulation 
is called for, in order to let workers to access a wide enough set of local financial providers and 
independent advisors. Regulation on transparency and consumer protection, designing more 
effective guidelines and supervision on how consultants inform and advise in pension choices, 
should restrain advisers’ incentives, following the best practices of the bans on inducement 
towards in-house products in the Netherlands and the UK (European Commission 2018).  
Second, on financial literacy, better policies should aim at designing more focused 
packages that, besides concepts more related to specific financial products, include also notions 
on how market structure features can narrow down the choices available to investors in the 






This study has some obvious limitations, starting with the loose matching between 
SHIW and COVIP data. The crude proxying of geographical distribution of PPPs providers 
warrants for a special module in future SHIWs. The evidence gathered on the geographical 
market structure opens however an interesting avenue for research in an international 
comparative perspective on this supply side feature as well as on the range of financial products 
sold by state-controlled and private providers. 
I view as a key shortcoming from a policy point of view the lack of microdata on self-
reported subscription rates associated with no contributions in the year of reference. Missing 
contributions, on COVIP data, from one fifth of enrollees in the private pensions system, one 
fourth for subscribers to PPPs and almost one third for self-employed subscribers, raise 
intriguing research questions on the role of financial literacy and saving of workers who have 
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Table 1.        Subscriptionsa and subscribersb (in italics, years 2016 and 2017) to the Private 
Pension System (end-year data, thousands)c 
 
 2007 2010 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Occupational Pension  
Funds (FPNs)  
1,989 2,011 1,944 2,419 2,597 2,561 2,805 2,762 3,001 
Open Pension Funds (FPAs)  747 848 1,056 1,150 1,259 1,230 1,374 1,343 1.462 
 
PIPs  











Grand Totale 4,560 5,272 6,540 7,235 7,787 7,147 
 
8,299 7,586 8,747 
 
Source: COVIP (2018). aData on subscriptions may include double counting referred to members 
enrolled in more than one pension fund. bData on subscribers in only one pension scheme available 
only since 2016 (see Online Appendix). cData including also subscriptions with no contributions in the 
reference year. d Source: Post Office. e “Old” PIPs and other types of pension funds included.  
 
Table 2.     Personal pension plans and sub-funds by investment – Compound net annual 
return rates (end-year percentages) 
 2009-2014





FPAs        5.2 3.0 4.1 
Guaranteed   2.7 2.2 1.8 
Bonds 3.2 2.7 2.1 
Mixed bonds   4.5 3.0 3.1 
Balanced   5.8 3.5 4.6 
All shares   7.2 3.4 5.9 
PIPs  
    Traditional Life Policies  
 
3.2 2.8 2.7 
    Unit linked     4.9 2.2 4.0 
  Bonds 1.9 1.6 1.2 
  Balanced  3.7 2.4 2.6 
  All shares  6.2 2.3 5.4 
Source: COVIP (2015, 2018). Return rates are net of management fees and of the substitute tax.  












Table 3.        Personal Pension Plans. Synthetic Cost Indicator (SCI) by investment sub-funds 
over different investment periods (annual average percent of the accrued capital).  
 SCI 
2 years 5 years 10 years 
35 
years 
Investment sub-funds     
Guaranteed FPAs 2.3 1.4 1.2 1.1 
PIPs 3.7 2.4 1.9 1.4 
Bonds FPAs 1.9 1.3 1.1 0.9 
PIPs 3.5 2.4 1.9 1.6 
Balanced 
FPAs 2.4 1.6 1.4 1.3 
PIPs 3.6 2.6 2.2 1.9 
All shares 
FPAs 2.8 1.9 1.7 1.6 
PIPs 4.5 3.2 2.7 2.3 
FPAs 2,3 1.6 1.3 1.2 
  min 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 
  max 5.1 3.4 2.8 2.4
PIPs 3,9 2.7 2.2 1.8 
  min 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.4 
  max 6.5 4.9 4.1 3.5
Source: COVIP (2018). SCI computed as simple average for each sub-fund.  
 
 
Table 4.  Correct answers on financial literacy for subscribers to the private pension system: 
full sample and HHs in the 2010 sample out of the 2010-2014 balanced panel (%) 
 






None  10.1 7.7 4.2 0.05 
One  17.7 14.1 6.5 1.3 
   Mortgage  64.6 15.6 8.1 1.8 
   Interest rate and inflation  75.6 17.5 8.7 2.0 
  Risk diversification  58.9 18.7 9.6 2.2 
Two  35.2 15.8 7.5 1.8 
  Mortgage & interest rate and inflation  53.6 16.6 8.5 2.0 
  Mortgage and  risk diversification  41.6 18.0 9.7 2.0 
  Risk diversification & interest rate 
and inflation 
 51.0 19.3 10.0 2.3 
At least two   68.9 17.6 8.8 2.1 
Three  37.0 18.6 10.0 2.2 







Table 5. PIPs’ share of personal pension plans (PPPs), conditional on being subscribed to any 
PPP. Heckman two step probit estimates (full samples)a 
 2010 2012 2014 
Second step: 
PIPs’ share of PPPs  
 
private employee    
 
public employee    
 
financial strength 
positive saving  
 
risky asset owner 
 
local sales force  
medium city  
(20,000 to 40,000)   
large city 
(40,000 to 500,000)   



































































Subscription rate to any 
PPP 
 
income deciles  
2nd     
 
3rd         
 
4th       
 
5th         
 
6th       
    
7th        
 
8th         
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10th      
 
demographics  
age        
 




upper secondary  
 










































































































single     
 
widowed      
 
private employee    
 
public employee    
 
small firm (5- 49)    
 
medium firm (50-99)    
 
big firm (100+)     
 
household location in the 
North         
household location in the 
Centre         
 
housing wealth 





positive saving  
 
risky asset owner 
 
local sales force  
medium city  
(20,000 to 40,000)   
large city 
(40,000 to 500,000)   

























































































































Uncensored (PPP) Obs no. 
Wald chi2 (7) 
Wald test of indep. eqns 














Source: Author’s calculations from  SHIW (various waves). t-statistics out of robust SEs within brackets; 
+p< 0.10, *p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. a 25 to 65 years old employed household heads. Reference 
categories: first decile of equivalised household income, male, up to lower secondary degree, married, 
self-employed, micro firm (1-4 workers), location in the South, small city (up to 20,000 inhabitants), no 







Table 6.  Average marginal effects for PIPs’ share of personal pension plans for 45 years old 
HHs. Heckman second step probit estimates; cross-sections samples out of 2010-2014 





















































Source: Author’s calculations from  SHIW (various waves); margins STATA 14 routine. t-statistics out 
of robust SEs within brackets; *p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01. a See Table 5; estimates for samples out of 2010-
2014 balanced panel available upon request.  
 
 
Table 7. PIPs’ share of personal pension plans, conditional on being subscribed to any PPP. 
Heckman two step probit estimates (cross-sections out of 2010-2014 balanced panel )a 
 2010 2012 2014 
Second step: 
 
PIPs’ share of PPPs  
 
 
private employee    
 
public employee    
 
financial strength 
positive saving  
 
risky asset owner 
 
local sales force  
medium city  
(20,000 to 40,000)   
large city 
(40,000 to 500,000)   
big city (500,000+) 
 
FinLit2010 






















































































   
First step (selected 
results)b: 
 








positive saving  
 
risky asset owner 
 
local sales force  
medium city  
(20,000 to 40,000)   
large city 
(40,000 to 500,000)   

























































































Uncensored (PPP) Obs 
no. 
Wald chi2 (7) 
Wald test of indep. eqns 

















Source: Author’s calculations from  SHIW (various waves). t-statistics out of robust SEs within brackets; 
+p< 0.10, *p< 0.05, ** p< 0.01, *** p< 0.001. a 25 to 65 years old employed household heads. Reference 
categories (for selected results): small city (up to 20,000 inhabitants), no home ownership, no saving, 









a. The wording on being subscribed to the private pension system in the 2010-
2014 SHIW questionnaires. 
(F01): In 201x, were you or a component of your household subscribed to any private 
pension plan? Yes/No.   
(F04): To which pension plan were you subscribed at end 201x: a) FPN; b) FPA; c) 
PIP; d) don’t know/don’t remember; e) no answer.  
Interestingly, in the 2016 SHIW, the a) alternative is redrafted, introducing explicitly 
also the category of preexisting occupational funds. 
b. The wording of the financial literacy questionnaire in the 2010 SHIW. 
1) Which type of mortgage allows you to determine the maximum amount and the 
number of instalments to pay in order to extinguish the debt?  a. variable interest rate mortgage; 
b. fixed interest rate mortgage; c. variable interest rate and constant instalment mortgage; d. 
don’t know; e. no answer. 
2) You have a no-costs deposit of 1,000 euro offering1 per cent interest rate.  
Assume 3 per cent inflation rate. Do you think that, when withdrawing your deposit one year 
later, you will be able to buy the same amount of goods that costs 1,000 euro today? a. yes; b. 
no, a minor amount; c. a greater amount; d. don’t know; e. no answer.  
3) Which investment strategy is riskier: a. invest in one company; b. invest in many 









Table A.1         Descriptive statistics (averages): employed household heads estimation full sample (% of 
observations) 
 
 2010  obs  =   5,347 2012  obs =   5,158 2014   obs =  4,810
PENS 0.2040396 0.1927104 0.1848233 
PIPs 0.0978119 0.0878247 0. 0858628 
FPAs 0.0246867 0.0224893 0.0237006 
Explanatory variables











age     
female       
upper secondary  
university degree  
single              
widow(er) 
private employee       
public employee       
small firm  (5- 49)  
medium firm (50-99)  
big firm  (100+)  
household location in the North             
household location in the Centre             
housing wealth 
home owner  
mortgagee  
financial strength 
saving > 0   
risky asset owner 
sellers’ local availability   
medium city (20,000 to 40,000) 
large city (40,000 to 500,000)       




























































































































Table A.2  Descriptive statistics (averages): employed household heads estimation in the sample out of the 
balanced panel (% of observations) 
    
 2010  (obs = 1660) 2012  (obs = 1653) 2014  (obs = 1621)
PENS 0.2174699 0.2171809 0.2220851 
PIPs 0.1072289 0.102843 0.102406 
FPAs 0.0222892 0.029038 0.029611 
Financial literacy level indicators: correct answers to 2010 SHIW three questions
Three      0.4481928 0.4440411 0.4361505 
At least two 0.7716867 0.7701149 0.770512 
Risk diversification & interest rate and    
inflation  
0.5903614 0.5898367 0.5848242 
Risk diversification  & mortgage 0.4783133 0.4742892 0.4663788 
Mortgage & interest rate  and  inflation  0.6198795 0.61464 0.6125848 
Risk  diversification    0.6445783 0.6448881 0.6403455 
Interest rate  and inflation  0.8319277 0.8294011 0.8297347 
Mortgage 0.696988 0.6908651 0.6890808 
Explanatory variables











age     
female       
upper secondary  
university degree  
single              
widow(er) 
private employee       
public employee       
small firm  (5- 49)  
medium firm (50-99)  
big firm  (100+)  
location in the North             
location in the Centre                      
housing wealth 
home owner  
mortgagee  
financial strength 
saving > 0   
risky asset owner 
sellers’ local availability   
medium city (20,000 to 40,000) 
large city (40,000 to 500,000)       


























































































































1 The data are gross of the subscriptions with missing contributions. The proportion is sizable 
and increasing during the 2010-2014 period: almost one fourth, rising to over 30 per cent for 
PIPs and even more for FPAs, hitting mostly self-employed who can rely exclusively on their 
own contributions (COVIP 2011, 2013, 2015). On the overestimation of PIPs data, owing to 
multiple memberships, see Online Appendix.   
2 The SCI takes into account the expected averaged main recurring costs for subscribers (initial 
membership, annual administration and management fees, transfer of the individual position 
across sub-funds) over different investment periods. 
3 Interestingly, personal plans share of investment of private pensions is 100% in Hungary and 
90 % in Poland, 25% in Italy, on 2016 data (OECD 2017). 
4 A subscriber to any private pension plan is entitled to an income tax break, up to 5,165 euros.   
5 The substitute tax rate was further raised retrospectively from 11.5% to 20% beginning on 
January 1, 2014, in the Financial Law for 2015, approved at the end of 2014. The survey data 
for the 2014 SHIW wave, collected during the year, before the unexpected innovation, should 
not be affected.  
6 Nominal income is not adjusted given the low inflation rates experienced in the period 2010-
14.  
7 Though even the number of dwellings – main residence and not – is sizably under-reported, 
the measurement issue should be plausibly less relevant when considering the main home 








8 I prefer this subjective information to the alternative of computing saving as income minus 
consumption expenditure, because the under- and mis-reporting in their nominal values, which 
affect especially the second variable, yield overestimated savings (Baffigi et al. 2016).  
9 In the three full sample waves there are only three (in 2010) and two (in 2012 and 2014) HHs 
subscribed to both FPAs and PIPs. In the estimates, these mixed cases have been imputed to 
FPAs.    
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